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Abstract
We report on an experiment in which subjects choose actions in strategic games with
either strategic complements or substitutes against a granny, a game theorist or other sub-
jects. The games are selected in order to test predictions on the comparative statics of
equilibrium with respect to changes in strategic ambiguity. We ﬁnd that subjects face
higher ambiguity while playing against the granny than playing against the game theorist
if we assume that subjects are ambiguity averse. Moreover, under the same assumption,
subjects choose more secure actions in games more prone to ambiguity which is in line with
the predictions.
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In standard game theory, strategic uncertainty in games is resolved in Nash equilibrium, at
least for games with a unique Nash equilibrium. Given a player’s equilibrium conjecture about
opponents’ play, she chooses a best response that conforms to the opponents’ equilibrium con-
jecture about her play. What if players lack conﬁdence in their equilibrium conjectures about
opponents’ play? This is plausible especially if the game is one-shot and players lack previous
experience with the same opponents. Lack of conﬁdence in probability judgements is modelled
formally by the literature on ambiguity or Knightian uncertainty (Schmeidler 1989, Gilboa
and Schmeidler 1989, Bewley 1986). Recently, such approaches have been applied to
strategic games (Dow and Werlang 1994, Eichberger and Kelsey 2000, Marinacci
2000).1 Results on the comparative statics of equilibrium under ambiguity have been derived
that should at least in principle be testable (Eichberger and Kelsey 2002, Eichberger,
Kelsey and Schipper 2006, Eichberger and Kelsey 2005).
To our knowledge, we present a ﬁrst attempt to analyze strategic ambiguity experimentally.
We design an experiment with two-player games, in which we try to introduce ambiguity by
varying the identity of the subjects’ opponent. Depending on the treatment, subjects have to
make choices against a granny, a game theorist or against some fellow subjects. We ﬁnd more
ambiguity averse behavior when subjects face the grandmother compared to the game theorist.
However, there does not seem to be a signiﬁcant diﬀerence between behavior against other
subjects and behavior against the grandmother.
The main goal of the experiment is a test of results on the comparative statics of equilib-
rium with respect to changes in ambiguity. In games with strategic complements and positive
externalities, equilibrium actions decrease when there is more ambiguity. The same holds for
games with strategic substitutes and negative externalities. The intuition is straight forward.
As example of the latter class of games, consider a two-person bargaining game. Players face
ambiguity over the share of the pie which the opponent will claim. An ambiguity-averse player
puts a high weight on bad outcomes, i.e., the event that the opponent demands a large share.
As a result, her best-response is to claim a low share. If ambiguity increases, the best-response
1See also Epstein (1997), Groes et al. (1998), Haller (2000), Klibanoff (1996), Lo (1996, 1999),
Mukerji (1997), and Ryan (2002).
2demand decreases.
In experiments, it is diﬃcult to control for a subject’s ambiguity. We vary, therefore,
cardinal payoﬀs of a game monotonically keeping the ordinal payoﬀ structure constant. In this
way we make games increasingly sensitive to ambiguity-averse behavior. We assume that a
decision maker facing ambiguity evaluates an action by the Choquet expect payoﬀ, i.e., she
forms expectations with respect to possibly non-additive beliefs. By changing the relative size
of cardinal payoﬀs in a suitable way we can manipulate Choquet expected payoﬀs such that a
given degree of ambiguity has a larger eﬀect on behavior. With this procedure we ﬁnd that our
experimental results are in line with the theoretical predictions for the games we analyze.2
The paper is organized as follows: The next section introduces brieﬂy the concept of strategic
ambiguity behind our study. Section 3 describes the design of the experiment, followed in
Section 4 by a formal statement of hypotheses and the experimental results. The appendix
contains a translation of the instructions.
2 Ambiguity in Strategic Games
Consider a ﬁnite two-player strategic game Γ = h(Ai)i=1,2,(ui)i=1,2i where Ai is player i’s ﬁnite
set of actions and ui : Ai×A−i −→ R is player i’s payoﬀ function. Each player’s ambiguity over
the opponent’s choice of actions is interpreted as a lack of conﬁdence in a probability assessment
over opponent’s actions. We assume that each player is a Choquet expected utility maximizer.
More precise, a player’s beliefs are represented by a capacity on A−i, i.e., a real-valued function
νi : 2A−i −→ R that satisﬁes monotonicity, for E,F ⊆ A−i, E ⊆ F implies νi(E) ≤ νi(F), and
normalization, νi(∅) = 0 and νi(A−i) = 1.
In order to compute the Choquet expected payoﬀ given a capacity νi, we order the payoﬀs of
each action ai from highest to lowest, u1
i(ai) > ... > uk
i (ai) > ... > uK
i (ai). Moreover, we denote
by Ak
−i(ai) := {a−i ∈ A−i : ui(ai,a−i) ≥ uk
i (ai)} the set of actions of the opponent which yield
better payoﬀs than uk
i (ai) with the convention A0
−i := ∅. Player i’s Choquet expected payoﬀ
2Apart from studying ambiguity, our results may be of independent interest for analyzing experimentally to
what extent the opponent’s identity has a systematic eﬀect on subjects’ play in strategic games.








Let the support of a capacity supp νi be deﬁned as in Dow and Werlang (1994) and
Eichberger and Kelsey (2000, 2002). More formally, supp νi is deﬁned as the set E ⊆ A−i
such that νi(A−i \ E) = 0 and νi(F) > 0 for all F such that A−i \ E $ F. There are several
notions of support of a capacity used in the literature.4 We use this notion here in order to be
comparable with the literature cited above.
An equilibrium under ambiguity of a ﬁnite two-player strategic game Γ is a tuple of capacities
(ν∗
i )i=1,2 such that for i = 1,2 there exists a non-empty support supp ν∗
i for which
supp ν∗




This deﬁnition is due to Dow and Werlang (1994). In equilibrium under ambiguity,
the support of each player’s equilibrium capacity is a subset of the opponent’s best responses
given the opponent’s equilibrium capacity. In two-player games, if beliefs are additive, then an
equilibrium under ambiguity coincides with a Nash equilibrium.
Capacities can be partially ordered by their ambiguity (see Marinacci 2000, and Eich-
berger and Kelsey 2002).5 A game has strategic complements (respectively strategic sub-
stitutes) if there exists an order on the action sets such that each player’s best-responses are
increasing (respectively decreasing) in the opponent’s action a−i on A−i. A game has posi-
tive (respectively negative) externalities if there exists an order on the action sets such that
ui(ai,a−i) is increasing (respectively decreasing) in a−i on A−i for all ai ∈ Ai and all play-
ers.6 Eichberger and Kelsey (2002, 2005) and Eichberger, Kelsey and Schipper
(2006) have shown the following results on the comparative statics of equilibrium with respect
3For more on Choquet expected utility theory, see Schmeidler (1989).
4For diﬀerent support notions of capacities compare Haller (2000), Marinacci (2000) and Ryan (2002).
5Formally, a capacity ν
00
i is reﬂects more ambiguity than a capacity ν
0










6For games with both properties, we require that those properties use the same order on the action sets.
4to ambiguity for players who are ambiguity averse.7 If a game has strategic complements and
positive (respectively negative) externalities, then equilibria under ambiguity are decreasing (re-
spectively, increasing) in ambiguity. The same holds for games with strategic substitutes and
negative (respectively, positive) externalities. Moreover, in games with strategic complements
and multiple equilibria, suﬃcient ambiguity selects among equilibria. Rather than reproducing
these results formally, we will illustrate them by an example of the class of 3x3 games which
we also use in the experiment.
Example Consider the class of 3x3 games
X Y Z
A c,b c,c c,0
B 0,b e,c e,0
C a,d d,c d,e
with 0 < a < b < c < d < e. This asymmetric game has a unique pure Nash equilibrium,
(B,Y ). If we deﬁne an order A < B < C and X < Y < Z, then it is easy to verify that this
asymmetric game has strategic complements and positive externalities. Given a capacity ν,
compute the Choquet expected payoﬀs of the row player for her three actions:
U(A,ν) = c
U(B,ν) = eν({Y,Z})
U(C,ν) = a + (d − a)ν({Y,Z}).
Suppose ν is such that U(A,ν) < U(B,ν). Then there exists a more ambiguous capacity ν0
with ν0({Y,Z}) < ν({Y,Z}) such that U(A,ν0) > U(B,ν0). This is the case if and only if
ν({Y,Z}) > c
e > ν0({Y,Z}. So, best-responses are decreasing in ambiguity.
In the experiments we try to manipulate the ambiguity for the same strategic game by letting
subjects play against diﬀerent opponents. There is no theory that tells us how to tie ambiguity
to the identity of an opponent. In order to elicit how a given player, faced with the same
7Ambiguity aversion is modelled by the Choquet integral of a convex capacity. Formally, a capacity is convex
if, for all E,F ⊆ A−i, νi(E) + νi(F) ≤ νi(E ∪ F) + νi(E ∩ F).
5opponent, responds to more ambiguity, we manipulate the cardinal payoﬀs of games keeping
the ordinal payoﬀ structure ﬁxed such that the choice becomes more sensitive to ambiguity.
This can be done by manipulating e and c such that c
e changes relative to ν({Y,Z}). The more
ambiguity-averse a subject is, the more likely she will choose A rather than B as the ratio c
e
falls.8 
In the experiment, subjects face three classes of strategic games: Firstly, games with
strategic complements, positive externalities and a unique pure Nash equilibrium, henceforth
“strategic complements”, secondly, games with strategic substitutes, negative externalities and
a unique pure Nash equilibrium, henceforth “strategic substitutes”, and thirdly, games with
strategic complements and multiple equilibria, henceforth “multiple equilibria”. There are four
3x3 versions of each class of games for which cardinal payoﬀs vary monotonically keeping the
ordinal payoﬀ structure constant.
Games 1 to 4 in Table 1 are games with strategic complements and positive externalities9
if we ﬁx the order A < B < C and X < Y < Z. They have a unique pure Nash equilibrium,
(B,Y ). In these games, A is the equilibrium action under ambiguity if ambiguity is suﬃciently
high, i.e., ν({Y,Z}) is less than the critical value c
e. Notice that the ratio c
e increases from game
1 to game 4. The eﬀect of ambiguity on these games has been discussed in the Example.
Games 5 to 8 are games with strategic substitutes and negative externalities if we ﬁx the
order A > B > C and X > Y > Z. They also have a unique pure Nash equilibrium, (B,Y ). For
high ambiguity, C is the only equilibrium action under ambiguity. The more ambiguity-averse
a subject is, the more likely she will choose C in these games. Since the critical value increases
from game 5 to 8, we should observe more subjects choosing C in this order of the games.
Finally, games 9 to 12 are games with strategic complements, positive externalities and
multiple equilibria if we ﬁx the order A < B < C and X < Y < Z. The pure-strategy Nash
equilibria of these games are (A,X) and (C,Z). For a suﬃciently high degree of ambiguity,
8For the class of games considered above, there is one caveat. We strongly prefer games in which no action
is weakly dominated by another (note that ambiguity respects dominance). Thus we also need to increase d
whenever we increase c. This inﬂuences the evaluation of action C in comparison to action B. However, action
A will be preferred to action C.
9The identiﬁcation numbers of the games are in the top left corner of each game matrix.
6Table 1: Experimental games
strategic complements strategic substitutes multiple equilibria
1. X Y Z
A 25,23 25,25 25,0
B 0,23 100,25 100,0
C 3,27 27,25 27,100
5. X Y Z
A 3,3 3,0 27,25
B 0,3 100,100 100,25
C 25,27 25,100 25,25
9. X Y Z
A 25,25 25,0 25,0
B 0,25 23,25 27,0
C 0,25 0,27 100,100
2. X Y Z
A 71,69 71,71 71,0
B 0,69 100,71 100,0
C 3,73 73,71 73,100
6. X Y Z
A 3,3 3,0 72,70
B 0,3 100,100 100,70
C 70,72 70,100 70,70
10. X Y Z
A 70,70 70,0 70,0
B 0,70 68,70 72,0
C 0,72 0,72 100,100
3. X Y Z
A 86,84 86,86 86,0
B 0,84 100,86 100,0
C 3,88 88,86 88,100
7. X Y Z
A 3,3 3,0 88,86
B 0,3 100,100 100,86
C 86,88 86,100 86,86
11. X Y Z
A 86,86 86,0 86,0
B 0,86 84,86 88,0
C 0,88 0,88 100,100
4. X Y Z
A 97,95 97,97 97,0
B 0,96 100,97 100,0
C 3,99 99,97 99,100
8. X Y Z
A 3,3 3,0 99,97
B 0,3 100,100 100,97
C 97,99 97,100 97,97
12. X Y Z
A 97,97 97,0 97,0
B 0,97 95,97 99,0
C 0,97 0,99 100,100
however, only (A,X) is an equilibrium under ambiguity. Notice that this equilibrium under
ambiguity coincides with the Pareto-dominated Nash equilibrium. As one moves from game 9
to 12 the critical value for the choice of the ambiguity-averse action increases.
Table 2 provides the critical values for which ambiguity changes the equilibrium behavior
in the twelve games considered.10
10Numbers with
∗ are just suﬃcient conditions. For the computations, we took into account the small random
constants added (see Footnote 15 in the next section).
7Table 2: Sensitivity to ambiguity
Choice Capacity Games
strategic complements
1 2 3 4
A ν({Y,Z}) < 0.27 0.72 0.86 0.97
strategic substitutes
5 6 7 8
C ν({Y,Z}) < 0.27 0.70 0.86 0.94
∗
multiple equilibria
9 10 11 12






The experiment was computerized using z-tree.11 In each treatment, subjects played the twelve
games described in the previous section. For each game, they had to make a choice of action
and indicate their belief about the opponent’s action. They did not receive any feedback about
the opponent’s choice of action after each game. We distinguish three treatments:
Treatment gt
In this treatment subjects were asked in each game to make choices of an action twice in the
row player’s position, one against a grandmother and one against a game theorist.12 Both,
the granny and the game theorist, were real people.13 Their choices were recorded prior to
the experiment with a paper-based questionnaire. The subjects knew that. Both, the granny
and the game theorist took the column player’s position. They knew that they were playing
11We are grateful to Urs Fischbacher for making this experimental software available to the profession
(Fischbacher 1999).
12For a screen-shot of this treatment see Figure 4 in the appendix.
13We want to emphasize that our experiment did not involve any deception of subjects. All the information
about the granny and the game theorist provided to the subjects were true.
8against subjects from subject-pool of the Bonn Laboratory for Experimental Economics (mostly
students). Until the very end of the experiment, subjects did not know either the choices of
the game theorist or the granny.
In addition to making choices, each subject was asked to state which actions of the respective
opponent she did “take into consideration for her choice”. The answers to this question provided
us with information about the strategies of the opponent, which subjects believed to be relevant
for their choice. We take these “stated beliefs” as a proxy for the support of the subjects’ beliefs
about their opponents’ behavior.
Treatment g
In this treatment subjects played only against the grandmother. Hence, they had to make only
one choice of action in each game. Otherwise this treatment is identical to Treatment gt.
Treatment s
In Treatment s subjects were playing against each other. An equal number of subjects was
selected for the row player position and the column player position. In each game, each subject
made a single choice of action against another subject. Subjects did not know the identity of
the opponent. For computing payoﬀs, players were matched randomly with an opponent. In
all other respects this treatment is identical to the Treatments gt and g.
For our method of testing ambiguity, we need to assume that ambiguity does not change
during the experiment. Hence, special eﬀorts were undertaken in order to avoid learning eﬀects.
First, we provided no feedback about the opponent’s choices between games. Second, we
made comparisons between games diﬃcult. We feared that if similarities of ordinal payoﬀs
are recognized, subjects analyze the games only a few times and then “log in” to a particular
default action. Subjects could not compare the games by clicking back and forward. They faced
the games in a random order.14 Moreover, the games’ payoﬀ structure was disguised by adding
14The games were presented in the following order: 2, 7, 9, 4, 6, 1, 11, 8, 12, 3, 5, 10.
9a randomly chosen small positive constant to each player’s payoﬀ.15 These constants perturb
the cardinal payoﬀs slightly, they make the games asymmetric but keep the ordinal payoﬀs
constant. In addition, subjects had to solve a payoﬀ-irrelevant memory task between games.
For this task, they had to memorize a couple of digits displayed for 5 seconds and repeat them
on the next screen. There is evidence in experimental cognitive psychology (Miller 1956) that
humans’ short-term memory span is limited to a few digits only. With this memory task we
wanted to erase the short-memory of previous games, thus making comparisons more diﬃcult.
Prior to the experiment, subjects received written instructions in German in which the
experimental setting was explained in detail (see the appendix for a translation). According to
the instructions, subjects knew that they were to make choices in 12 games against a granny,
a game theorist, or other subjects, respectively. Subjects were, however, not informed about
the types of games which they were to play. In order to be convincing in our claim that the
grandmother and the game theorist were indeed real people we provided subjects with additional
information about their background. E.g., we informed subjects that the granny is old, raised
8 children, and lives in a village in East-Germany and that the game theorist is a successful
professor.
The instructions contained also an example of a game which did not belong to the classes
of games which they would face in the experiment. With this example we tested prior to the
experiment whether subjects understood how payoﬀs in a game are derived given the choices
of the players. The instructions contained also the exchange rate, for which payoﬀs where
exchanged into EURO at the end of the experiment.
At the end of the experiment, subjects had to ﬁll in a brief questionnaire at the computer.
The questionnaire contained questions about profession, gender, prior knowledge of game theory
or economics, as well as how ambiguous they felt about opponents’ choices. Subjects did not
know the questions of the questionnaire when they played the games.
15 The following table contains the constants which were added.
Game
Player 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
Row 3 2 1 0 3 1 2 1 3 2 1 0
Column 1 1 0 1 1 2 1 3 0 1 2 1
10Once all the information was collected, three games were randomly selected, their outcomes
were computed, converted into EUROS, and paid to the subjects immediately after the exper-
iment. The same holds for the granny and the game theorist, except that they received their
payoﬀs several days after their choices. The subjects’ answers to our questions were not re-
warded. The experiment lasted for approximately half an hour and subjects earned on average
EUR 10.50.
The participants of our experiment were 54 subjects from the subject-pool of the Bonn
Laboratory for Experimental Economics, a grandmother and a game theorist. All, but one,
subjects of the Bonn Laboratory reported that they were students. About 36 percent were
students of economics or mathematics. Approximately 24 percent had participated in a course
on game theory. Of the students, 36 percent were female.
The granny and the game theorist were approached directly by the experimenter. We col-
lected the data from the granny and the game theorist a couple of days prior to the experiment.
The students’ experiment was conducted in the Bonn Laboratory for Experimental Economics
in June 2004.
We had 18 subjects for each treatment. Since choices were not revealed until the very end
of the experiment, we have 18 independent observations for each treatment. Because the games
are not symmetric, however, only the 9 observations of the row players in Treatment s are
comparable with the observations from the other treatments.
4 Hypotheses and Results
Ambiguity about the behavior of the opponent as modelled by the Choquet expected utility ap-
proach described in Section 2 induces predictable behavior in games. Our ﬁrst set of hypotheses
and results concern the question whether there are any measurable eﬀects of ambiguity about
the opponent’s behavior. Our second set of hypotheses and results deals with these comparative
statics predictions.
We know from previous experiments on ambiguity in single person decision problems (Camerer
and Weber 1992) that the majority of subjects behave in an ambiguity-averse manner. Hence,
we maintain the assumption that subjects behave ambiguity-averse throughout this experiment.
114.1 Is there ambiguity?
Our motivation for treatments with a grandmother and a game theorist comes from the fact
that behavior of subjects may in general not be ambiguous enough to produce observable
eﬀects. A priori it is not clear why the behavior of a grandmother should be more ambiguous
than that of a game theorist. Given the subject pool of students at the University of Bonn,
however, who in some cases have had some experience with game theory, our presumption was
that these students would feel less ambiguous about the behavior of an expert game theorist
than about the behavior of the grandmother, obviously an non-specialist opponent. We tried
to re-enforce this “non-specialist” feature of the grandmother by explicitly mentioning in the
instructions that the granny, in contrast to the game theorist, had diﬃculties in understanding
the experimental set up.
Based on this assumption we expect that subjects felt more ambiguity playing against the
granny than playing against the game theorist in Treatment gt, the only treatment where such
a direct comparison is possible. Our experimental results provide us both with a subject’s
self-assessed feeling of ambiguity and with her actual choice of action. This design motivates
the following two hypotheses.
Firstly, we consider ambiguity associated with the player. We predict that subjects will
report more ambiguity when playing against the granny. Secondly, we look at ambiguity about
the opponent’s choice of action. We predict that the higher ambiguity regarding the granny’s
choice is reﬂected in the stated beliefs about the set of the opponent’s actions which a subject
considers possible. The more actions of the opponent a player takes into account, the more
ambiguity she experiences. Hence, beliefs about the grandmother’s choice should be more coarse
than beliefs about the game theorist’s choice.
Hypothesis 1 In Treatment gt,
(i) subjects report more ambiguity about the behavior of the granny than about the behavior
of the game theorist,
(ii) stated beliefs about the grandmother’s choice of actions are coarser as the stated beliefs
about the game theorist’s actions.
12Secondly, regarding actual behavior, we predict that more subjects choose the more ambiguity-
averse action if they face the grandmother. For games with strategic complements (Games 1 to
4), A is an equilibrium action under ambiguity and, for games with strategic substitutes (Games
5 to 8), C is an equilibrium action under ambiguity, while B is the unique Nash equilibrium
in both cases. In games with multiple equilibria (Games 9 to 12), actions A and C are Nash
equilibrium actions. For high ambiguity, however, only A remains an equilibrium action under
ambiguity. We should, therefore, expect that the equilibrium actions under ambiguity, A in
Games 1 to 4 and C in Games 5 to 8, will be chosen more often against the granny than against
the game theorist. Moreover, we would expect to see the unique Nash equilibrium strategy B
in Games 1 to 8 and the Pareto-dominant Nash equilibrium strategy C in Games 9 to 12 more
often played against the game theorist than against the granny.
Hypothesis 2 In Treatment gt, we expect to observe the following behavior:
(i) In games with strategic complements (Games 1 to 4), more (respectively, less) often action
A (respectively, B) is chosen against the granny than against the game theorist.
(ii) In games with strategic substitutes (Games 5 to 8), more (respectively, less) often action
C (respectively, B) is chosen against the granny than against the game theorist.
(iii) In games with multiple equilibria (Games 9 to 12), more (respectively, less) often action
A (respectively, C) is chosen against the granny than against the game theorist.
Turning to our results. In the questionnaire of Treatment gt we asked subjects the questions
listed in Table 3. These questions relate to the ambiguity associated with the opponent’s
identity. Table 3 shows that 72% of the subjects feel they can predict the behavior of the game
theorist better than that of the grandmother. Consistent with this assessment, 72% of the
subjects report that they prefer to play against the game theorist. We can reject the hypothesis
that subjects can guess the granny’s behavior better than the game theorist’s behavior (resp.
prefer to play against the granny than against the game theorist) at the 0.05 conﬁdence level
using a Binomial test. For the third question, the degree of certainty was measured on an
integer scale ranging from 0 to 5, with complete uncertainty at 0 and complete certainty at 5.
Table 3 reveals that, on average, subjects were more certain about the game theorist’s behavior
13with 3.3 than about the grandmother’s behavior with 1.6. These averages rather hide the actual
extent of the uncertainty, since 10 of 18 subjects were certain or completely certain (4 or 5)
about the behavior of the game theorist and just 2 subjects felt uncertain or very uncertain
(0 or 1). Even stronger is the rating of the granny, where only one subject was certain or
completely certain (4 or 5) about the behavior of the granny and 10 subjects felt uncertain or
very uncertain (0 or 1). Using a Wilcoxon Signed Ranks test, we can reject the hypothesis that
subjects can guess the behavior of both opponents equally well at the 0.03 conﬁdence level.
Table 3: Perceived ambiguity
Question Game theorist Granny
1. Whose behavior can you guess better? 72% 28%
2. Whom would you prefer to play against? 72% 28%
3. How certain are you about the behavior of ...? 3.3 1.6
To see which of the opponent’s strategies subjects considered as important for their choice,
we turn to Figure 1. This ﬁgure shows how often subjects reported a non-singleton belief about
the opponent’s actions. Clearly, stated beliefs diﬀer by opponents. Subjects in Treatment gt
state more often a non-singleton belief16 when playing against the grandmother (50 percent)
than when playing against the game theorist (40 percent). This provides some support for our
hypothesis that subjects feel more certain about the behavior of the game theorist. We can
reject the hypothesis that subjects stated equally often a coarse belief (i.e., two or more actions)
for the game theorist and for the granny at a 0.05 conﬁdence level using a Wilcoxon Signed
Rank test.
We summarize these results in Observation 1.
Observation 1 In Treatment gt, we can not reject Hypothesis 1:
(i) Subjects reported signiﬁcantly more ambiguity about the behavior of the granny than about
the behavior of the game theorist.
16These averages are calculated for all subjects who stated a belief. In four percent of the cases subjects did
not state a belief at all





















(ii) Stated beliefs about the grandmother’s choice are signiﬁcantly more often coarser than
stated beliefs about the game theorist’s choice.
Figure 2 provides information on Hypothesis 2. In the games with strategic complements,
in the upper diagram of Figure 2, 36 percent of subjects chose the equilibrium action under
ambiguity A against the grandmother, while only 21 percent chose this action against the game
theorist. This diﬀerence is signiﬁcant at a 0.11 level using a Wilcoxon Sign Rank test. This
observation is consistent with Hypothesis 2 (i). However, also the unique Nash equilibrium
action B is chosen more often against the grandmother (by 39 percent of the subjects) than
against the game theorist (by 35 percent of the subjects), which is contrary to Hypothesis 2(i).
This diﬀerence though is insigniﬁcant (0.38 level).17 It is surprising how often action C, which
is neither a Nash equilibrium action nor an equilibrium action under ambiguity, was chosen
against the game theorist (by 44 percent of the subjects) in this sequence of games.18
17We have to note a caveat: Since Treatment gt concerns a one sample treatment with dependent variables,
we could not test for the diﬀerence of the joint distributions of A’s and B’s.
18We suspect that this obviously “irrational” behavior against the game theorist may be a consequence of the
random order of games, since the choice of C was most pronounced in games following a multi-equilibria game
15In the games with strategic substitutes in the middle diagram of Figure 2, action C is
chosen more often against the grandmother (by 28 percent of subjects) than against the game
theorist (by 18 percent of subjects), which is signiﬁcant at a 0.10 level. Strategy C is the only
equilibrium action under suﬃciently large ambiguity. The unique Nash equilibrium action B is
chosen less often against the grandmother (by 68 percent of subjects) than against the game
theorist (by 78 percent of subjects). This diﬀerence is only signiﬁcant at a 0.12 level. Both
observations are consistent with Hypothesis 2(ii).
Finally, in the games with multiple equilibria in the lower diagram of Figure 2, 55 percent of
the subjects chose action A against the grandmother, while only 33 percent of the subjects chose
this strategy against the game theorist. This is signiﬁcant at a 0.08 level. In contrast, action C
is chosen less often against the grandmother (by 47 percent of the subjects) than against the
game theorist (by 58 percent of the subjects). This diﬀerence is not signiﬁcant (0.24 level). For
low ambiguity, both actions are Nash equilibrium actions and actions in an equilibrium under
ambiguity, but if ambiguity is suﬃciently large then action A becomes the unique equilibrium
action under ambiguity. Both observations are consistent with Hypothesis 2(iii).
Observation 2 summarizes these ﬁndings.
Observation 2 In Treatment gt, there is mixed evidence for Hypothesis 2(i), but we cannot
reject Hypothesis 2(ii) and Hypothesis 2 (iii):
(i) In Games 1 to 4 (strategic complements), subjects chose signiﬁcantly (resp. insigniﬁ-
cantly) more often the ambiguity averse action (resp. the Nash equilibrium action) against
the grandmother than against the game theorist.
(ii) In Games 5 to 8 (strategic substitutes), subjects chose signiﬁcantly more (resp. less)
often the ambiguity averse (resp. Nash equilibrium) action against the grandmother than
against the game theorist.
(iii) In Games 9 to 12 (multiple equilibria), subjects chose signiﬁcantly more (resp. insignif-
icantly less) often the ambiguity averse action (resp. the Pareto-dominant Nash equilib-
rium) against the grandmother than against the game theorist.
where C was the equilibrium action of the Pareto-dominant Nash equilibrium.












































































17Treatment gt provides the opportunity to compare the behavior of subjects playing games
against two opponents with identical payoﬀs but clearly distinguished by personal characteris-
tics. The two other treatments, Treatment g and Treatment s, serve as control treatments. Our
a priori hypothesis was that behavior when playing against other subjects should create less
ambiguity than playing against the granny, but more ambiguity than playing against the game
theorist. Comparing ﬁrstly Treatments g and s, these considerations can be expressed by the
following two hypotheses. The ﬁrst two hypotheses compare stated beliefs and actual behavior
in Treatment g and in Treatment s. Hypothesis 3 is analogous to Hypothesis 1. We assume
that the higher ambiguity against the granny compared to the other subjects is reﬂected in the
subjects’ statements.
Hypothesis 3 In comparing Treatment g and Treatment s, stated beliefs about the grand-
mother’s choice are more coarse compared to stated beliefs about other subjects.
Hypothesis 4 parallels Hypothesis 2. We predict that the equilibrium action under ambiguity
will be chosen more often against the granny than against other subjects, while the Nash
equilibrium action will be more often against other subjects.
Hypothesis 4 In comparing Treatment g and Treatment s, we expect the following facts:
(i) In games with strategic complements (Games 1 to 4), more (respectively, less) often
action A (respectively, B) is chosen against the granny than against other subjects.
(ii) In games with strategic substitutes (Games 5 to 8), more (respectively, less) often action
C (respectively, B) is chosen against the granny than against other subjects.
(iii) In games with multiple equilibria (Games 9 to 12), more (respectively, less) often action
A (respectively, C) is chosen against the granny than against other subjects.
The answers to the questionnaire at the end of the experiment hint a ﬁrst answer to Hy-
pothesis 3. In Treatments g and s, we asked each subject to rate on a scale from 0 (complete
uncertainty) to 5 (complete certainty) how certain he or she was about the behavior of the
grandmother or the other subject, respectively. The average reports are very similar in both
treatments, 2.6 for Treatment g and 2.7 for Treatment s.
18A similar conclusion can be drawn when looking at stated beliefs in Figure 1. In fact, there
was more ambiguity reported about the choices of the other subject than about those of the
granny. However, the diﬀerence is not signiﬁcant (0.27 level using a Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney
test). Observation 3 states this result.
Observation 3 We can reject Hypothesis 3: Stated beliefs about the grandmother’s choice in
Treatment g are less coarse than stated beliefs about other subject’s choice in Treatment s.
Examining Figure 2 shows that also the choices of actions were almost identical in both
treatments. In the case of strategic complements (Games 1 to 4), the equilibrium action under
ambiguity was chosen even slightly more often against the other subject than against the granny
and the Nash equilibrium action was chosen more often against the granny. The diﬀerence
between the joint distributions of actions is not signiﬁcant (0.9 level for strategic complements
and substitutes and 0.5 for multiple equilibria using a X 2 test).
Observation 4 In comparing Treatments g and s, we can reject Hypothesis 4:
(i) In games with strategic complements (Games 1 to 4), insigniﬁcantly more (resp. less)
often action B (resp. A) is chosen against the granny than against other subjects.
(ii) In games with strategic substitutes (Games 5 to 8), insigniﬁcantly more (resp. less) often
action C (resp. B) is chosen against the granny than against other subjects.
(iii) In games with multiple equilibria (Games 9 to 12), insigniﬁcantly more (resp. less) often
action A (resp. C) is chosen against the granny than against other subjects
Observations 3 and 4 suggest that the perceived ambiguity as well as the actual behavior
were similar in Treatment g and Treatment s. It is important to keep in mind, however, that,
for Treatment s, this comparison rests on a much smaller number of observations, since only
the behavior of the nine row players are used.
Finally, comparing Treatment gt and g, our ex-ante presumption was that one would ﬁnd
the same perceived ambiguity and the same behavior under ambiguity in regard to the granny
in both treatments.
19Hypothesis 5 Choices and stated beliefs when playing against the grandmother in Treatment gt
do not diﬀer from Treatment g.
In fact, Figure 1 shows quite clearly that subjects were considering signiﬁcantly more often
non-singleton beliefs when facing the grandmother in Treatment g than in Treatment gt. This
diﬀerence is signiﬁcant at a 0.03 level using a Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test. Similarly, Figure 2
reveals that the ambiguity-related actions, A in Games 1 to 4, C in Games 5 to 8, and A in
Games 9 to 12, were chosen more often in Treatment g than in Treatment gt. The diﬀerence
between the joint distributions of actions is signiﬁcant at a 0.05 (resp. 0.02) level for strategic
complements (resp. multiple equilibria) but insigniﬁcant for strategic substitutes (0.5 level with
a X 2 test). To sum up, it appears that subjects felt more ambiguity when playing against the
grandmother in Treatment g than in Treatment gt.
Observation 5 In comparing Treatments gt and g, we can reject Hypothesis 5:
(i) Stated beliefs about the grandmother’s choice are signiﬁcantly more often coarser when
playing against the grandmother in Treatment g than in Treatment gt.
(ii) Play against the granny in Treatment gt diﬀered signiﬁcantly from Treatment g. In par-
ticular, the ambiguity-related actions (resp. Nash equilibrium actions) were more (resp.
less) often chosen in Treatment g than in Treatment gt.
Observation 5 records stronger ambiguity eﬀects in Treatment g than in Treatment gt.
Though we did expect that playing against the grandmother would create some ambiguity, we
were surprised to ﬁnd this ambiguity to be substantially smaller in the Treatment gt where
subjects face both the granny and the game theorist. We speculate that this ﬁnding is due to
a presentation eﬀect. Treatment gt is likely to lead subjects towards a comparative judgement
between the game theorist and the granny. Such comparative analysis may lead to diﬀerent
judgements of the granny when the granny is the only opponent to judge as in Treatment g.
4.2 How do subjects react to ambiguity?
The core hypotheses of this article concern the comparative statics analysis of behavior under
ambiguity. As explained in Section 2, we constructed the sequence of games in each of the
20three variants, strategic complements, strategic substitutes and multiple equilibria, such that
the critical level for changing behavior towards the equilibrium action under ambiguity rose
with the number of the game. Table 2 contains these critical levels. In each group of games
the sensitivity to ambiguity increased with the number of the games. Hence, we advance the
following hypothesis.
Hypothesis 6 For all treatments, we expect to observe following comparative statics:
(i) In games with strategic complements, choices of action A (respectively, B) increase (re-
spectively, decrease) from Game 1 to 4.
(ii) In games with strategic substitutes, choices of action C (respectively, B) increase (re-
spectively, decrease) from Game 5 to 8.
(iii) In games with multiple equilibria, choices of action A (respectively, C) increase (respec-
tively, decrease) from Game 9 to 12.
Turning now to our results, the left diagrams of Figure 3 show how the frequency of the
equilibrium action under ambiguity changes in all treatments and against all opponents. With
the exception of Treatment gt, we ﬁnd for each class of games that the equilibrium action under
ambiguity increases as the games become more ambiguity-sensitive, i.e., from the lower to the
higher game number. The exception is play against the game theorist in games with strategic
complements and against the granny in games with strategic substitutes, where in Games 3, 8
and 10 a decline has to be noted.
The right diagrams in Figure 3 show the frequency of choice for the unique Nash equilibrium
action B in response to increasingly ambiguity-sensitive games. With the exception of Games
3, 8, and 11 we observe a decrease in all treatments and against all opponents.19
We test the results on the comparative statics by comparing each subject’s choices in Game
1 versus Game 4 (and similarly Game 5 vs. Game 8 and Game 9 vs. Game 12). We exclude
all observations of actions that are neither an equilibrium action under ambiguity nor a Nash
equilibrium. We test as the null-hypothesis that switches from the Nash equilibrium to the
19Notice that the exceptions seem to occur in the same games.
21ambiguity-averse action and vice versa are equally likely. We can reject this hypothesis except
for play against the game theorist in games with strategic complements and in games multiple
equilibria in Treatment gt.20 Summarizing these results, we obtain Observation 6.
Observation 6 We can not reject Hypothesis 6, except for play against the game theorist in
games with strategic complements and multiple equilibria (Treatment gt).
5 Concluding Discussion
In experiments on single-person decision problems, ambiguity plays a role as many studies of
the Ellsberg-paradox show. Camerer and Weber (1992) provide a survey of these results.
Strategic problems are usually even more complex, so it appears reasonable to assume that
ambiguity plays an even bigger role in strategic games. Camerer and Karjalainen (1994)
report experiments on strategic versions of Ellsberg’s two and three color experiments which
seems to conﬁrm this presumption. In their experiments ambiguity concerns the payoﬀs of the
opponents. They ﬁnd evidence that a substantial fraction of behavior is inconsistent with the
assumption of additive beliefs over opponents’ types.
To our knowledge, we present a ﬁrst attempt to analyze strategic ambiguity experimentally.
By varying the identity of the opponent, we try to introduce diﬀerent levels of ambiguity in
strategic games. Moreover, by varying the cardinal payoﬀs but keeping the ordinal payoﬀ
structure constant, we make games more or less sensitive to the given amount of ambiguity in
the experiment. We ﬁnd that both varying opponents and varying the payoﬀ structure have
eﬀects predicted by the theory on ambiguity in games.
In Treatments gt and g, we used “loaded” instructions in the sense that we described the
20The signiﬁcance levels using a Sign Test are given by
Treatment strategic complements strategic substitutes multiple equilibria
gt granny 0.03 0.02 0.01
gt game theorist 0.25 0.11 0.23
g 0.01 0.01 0.01
s 0.03 0.12 0.03
22Figure 3: Comparative statics




































































































































23background of the granny and the game theorist in order to be convincing in our claim that
these opponents were indeed real persons. It is therefore justiﬁed to ask whether social motives
could have brought about the observed diﬀerence in choices against the granny and the game
theorist. A preliminary check suggests that social motives such as altruism or inequity aversion
will induce behavior which is opposed to the one predicted by ambiguity aversion. Thus, they
may in fact strengthen our comparative statics results.
A Example of Instructions: Treatment gt (Translation)
Welcome to the Experiment
You participate in an experiment on decision making. You can earn some money. Your earnings depend
on your decisions as well as the decisions of a grandmother and a game theorist. Latter decisions we
recorded already prior to the experiment today.
The Grandmother
The grandmother is 84 years old. She lives beside a forest in a village in Saxony. She comes from a
farmer’s family and raised 8 children. She likes to take care of her large garden, to solve crossword
puzzles, and to watch TV. She faced some diﬃculties with understanding today’s experiment.
The Game Theorist
Game theory is a mathematical theory of strategic decision making such as today’s experiment on decision
making. The game theorist is Professor of Economic Theory at the University of Bonn. Previously, he
worked at Stanford University and Humboldt University, Berlin. He earned a diploma in mathematics
and a Ph.D. in economic theory. He published quite a number of articles on game theory in international
journals such as the Journal of Economic Theory. He didn’t face any diﬃculties with understanding
today’s experiment.
Your Decision
Your goal is to maximize your earnings through your choice. You will face decision problems like in the
following example (Figure 4):
You have three actions (A, B, and C), which are marked as rows in above table. The other participant
(the grandmother or the game theorist) has three actions as well (X, Y , and Z) (the columns in above
table). The numbers in the cells of the table indicate the possible payoﬀs, whereby your payoﬀ is always
24Figure 4: Screen-Shot
the ﬁrst number in front of the semicolon (;) of each cell, whereas the second payoﬀ belongs to the other
participant. For example, if you choose A and the other participant chooses Y , then you receive 56 Taler
and the other participant 99 Taler.21
Under the table to the left you are supposed to choose your action: One action against the grand-
mother and one against the game theorist. Prior to your decision, we naturally do not inform you, how
the grandmother and the game theorist chose against you. Your payoﬀ depends as indicated in above
table on your choice and the choice by the grandmother and the game theorist.
Under the table to the right you are supposed to mark the actions that you can not rule out for the
21Note that Figure 4 contains a translated screen-shot in which numbers do not correspond to the translation
of the instruction. This is not the case in the German original.
25grandmother and the game theorist. These are the actions for which you assume that they could be
eventually chosen by the grandmother or the game theorist. Here it is possible to mark several actions.
After you made your selection, click “O.K.”, and the experiment is continued with a memory task
on a new screen. The memory task does not inﬂuence your payoﬀ but serves just as an intermediate
step between the decision making situations. A sequence of numbers is displayed to you for 5 seconds,
which you should try to remember. After 5 seconds you are asked on a new screen to reproduce the
sequence. After the memory task a new screen appears with a new decision making situation analogous
to above. In total there are 12 decision making situations.
Your Earnings
After the decision making situations follows a brief questionnaire. Then you will be informed about your
total earnings. To calculate your total earnings, 3 decision making situations are selected randomly. For
each of these 3 decision making situations the payoﬀ depends on your decisions and the decision of the
grandmother and the game theorist as described above. Your total earnings is the sum of payoﬀs from
the 3 decision making situations against the grandmother as well as the 3 decision making situations
against the game theorist. Your total earnings are exchanged with an exchange rate of 40 Taler = 1
EUR. This amount will be paid to you immediately after the experiment in cash.
In each cabin is a exercise-sheet, which should be completed before the experiment, and which will
collected by the experimenter. Only then the experiment will be started. If you have questions now or
during the experiment, please quietly contact the experimenter.
Thank you for your participation.
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